Abstract

We propose an oligopolistic competition model where exchanged products are simultaneously differentiated in horizontal and vertical dimen sions. Perfect NASH equilibria are defined supposing that some decisions sequen cies are expressed in terms of prices, technical characteristics and quality. In this context, it appears that horizontal differentiation is maximum at the equili brium. Econometric estimations on panel data show a recursive prices deter mination of French cars sold on the national market and the importance of technical characteristics in the short and long run prices formation. Furthermore, these estimations prove that the market segmentation is realized from quality.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.