Abstract

Smart grid enables two-way communications between operation centers and smart meters to collect power consumption and achieve demand response to improve flexibility, reliability, and efficiency of electricity system. However, power consumption data may contain users’ privacy, e.g., activities, references, and habits. Many smart metering schemes have been proposed utilizing homomorphic encryption for users’ privacy preservation. Unfortunately, some abnormality of smart meter reading, e.g., caused by electricity theft, cannot be discovered since data is encrypted. Meanwhile, operation centers could become curious in reality. To address the above issues, we propose a new privacy-preserving smart metering scheme for smart grid, which supports data aggregation, differential privacy, fault tolerance, and range-based filtering simultaneously. Specifically, we extend lifted ElGamal encryption to aggregate users’ consumption reports at the gateway to reduce communication overhead, while supporting fault tolerance of malfunctioning smart meters effectively. We also leverage zero-knowledge range proof to filter abnormal measurements caused by electricity theft or false data injection attacks without exposing individual measurements. In addition, our scheme can resist differential attacks, by which the curious operation center can violate users’ privacy through comparing two aggregations of the similar data set. Finally, we discuss the properties of the proposed scheme and evaluate its performance in terms of security and efficiency.

Full Text
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