Abstract
In 'Good' on Twin Earth I set about defending a semantics for moral terms that builds, in important ways, on recent developments in the semantics of natural kind terms without treating moral terms as natural kind terms. My hope is that the account that emerges can claim certain advantages not available to others even as it avoids seeing moral terms as referring to natural kinds. Putting my hope in this way makes clear, I trust, just why the comments by Professors Sosa and Kim are so relevant. Professor Sosa's main concern is that the primary advantages I claim for the semantic approach I favor are actually features of any plausible semantic view.2 And Professor Kim's main concern is that my view will be metaphysically acceptable only if I give up the idea, which is central to my approach, that moral kinds are distinct from natural kinds.3 In effect, then, Professor Sosa wonders why one should bother trying to defend the view in
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
