Differences in cognitive distortions between problem and social gamblers.

Abstract

The cognitive model of gambling argues that irrational beliefs and erroneous perceptions including illusions of control, superstitious beliefs, expectancies of winning, attributional biases, selective memory, and entrapment play a pivotal role in the development and maintenance of impaired control over patterns of gambling behaviours. Assessment strategies using self-report, behavioural inferences, and verbalizations produced by 'thinking aloud' techniques, and the effectiveness of treatment interventions designed to correct cognitive distortions have provided substantive empirical evidence supporting this model. However, research has yet to measure such differences between the quality, intensity, or conviction of specific dysfunctional beliefs held by problem in contrast to social gamblers. At the theoretical level, the absence of such demonstrable differences would undermine the validity of the cognitive explanatory model. Based on a review of the available literature, a preliminary measure to assess differences in irrational gambling beliefs was constructed and administered to a convenience sample of 56 problem gamblers and 52 social gamblers. In support of the cognitive model, analysis indicated that, compared to social gamblers, problem gamblers endorsed more irrational beliefs across all domains except for the variable of 'denial'. Implications for research issues relevant to the identification of irrational beliefs that may be subjected to challenge within a cognitive therapy paradigm are mentioned.