Abstract
According to Carnap an account of the nature of mathematics, both pure and applied, must include the thesis that mathematical truths are devoid of factual content. He first formulated this thesis around 1930 and in its defence attempted to combine the reduction of mathematics to logic undertaken in the Principia with Wittgenstein’s insights into the nature of logic. In this paper I will show that this synthesis faces serious difficulties. Thus, it plays, with good reason, no longer a role in Carnap’s mature philosophy of mathematics.
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