Die Souveränität Der Schwachen: Lateinamerika Und Der Völkerbund, 1920–1936

Abstract

In this excellently researched monograph, Thomas Fischer scrutinizes Latin America’s relationship with the League of Nations. Grounded on extensive research in mainly diplomatic archives in no less than 13 countries, the study is a showcase of the advantages of patient, multiperspective historical scholarship. Seven chapters, stretching over more than 420 pages, reconstruct the role of Latin America’s “weak states” in the League of Nations in painstaking detail.Although many Latin American countries had remained neutral during the First World War, the majority of them soon became involved with the league. As Fischer demonstrates, Latin American diplomats considered their countries to be weak, and they hoped that the organization in Geneva would become a guarantor of sovereignty against potential encroachments by more powerful states. Although some governments, such as that of Baltasar Brum in Uruguay, believed that the league’s universalist claims were compatible with Pan- Americanism, Latin American politicians more commonly saw the organization as a useful counterweight against rising US imperialism. In spite of this initial enthusiasm, there were, to be sure, absences, frictions, and fallouts between the league and Latin American countries, especially the larger ones. Due to US opposition, Mexico was admitted only very belatedly (in 1931). After Argentina’s demands for full equality among all members went unheeded, it remained absent in practice during the early 1920s. Brazil vetoed Germany’s admission and dropped out sulking in 1926, since its delegates had failed to secure the country a permanent seat on the council. Even so, most Latin Americans continued to view the league favorably as a means to safeguard peace and sovereignty.Fischer shows that such hopes were too optimistic. Since the United States never joined, the league was dominated by European powers with little interest in Latin America. With beliefs similar to the Monroe Doctrine, which to the dismay of many in Latin America was explicitly enshrined in the league’s covenant, most British and French politicians and diplomats regarded the region as one to be dominated by the United States. The league therefore tended to stay clear of trying to settle conflicts in the Americas, such as the long- simmering Tacna- Arica dispute or US meddling in Nicaragua. In the case of the Leticia incident and the Chaco War, Geneva did play a role, albeit a hesitant and belated one. Even if Fischer underlines that Latin Americans gradually managed to gain greater representation in the league’s bureaucracy, the overall story that emerges from this study is one of growing disenchantment and, ultimately, one of failure.This interpretation is founded on an excellent documentary base and is hence wholly persuasive, but it raises questions about the broader picture. Although many readers will appreciate that Fischer is not given to hyperbole and has no time for grand claims, flashy concepts, and fashionable terminology, they might possibly wish for a clearer statement of the book’s contribution to historical scholarship. The author modestly situates his findings within a virtually unknown set of works (including MA theses) that cover the same topic, defined in a narrow sense. This makes it difficult for Fischer to speak to nonspecialist readers with a more general interest either in Latin American history or in the international relations of the interwar period. In a footnote he mentions in passing that the recently burgeoning scholarship on the league has unduly neglected Latin America (p. 17). Again, this is irrefutable, but he is less forthcoming in explaining how this scholarship would have to be modified if his findings were taken into account. After reading the book, some readers might leave with the impression that if Latin America is not normally mentioned in this recent literature, it is simply because the region did not play an important role in the League of Nations. Conversely, Fischer’s study does not give the impression that the league had very tangible effects on Latin American politics either.While the author is perhaps reluctant in telling us how his story matters for the broader history either of international relations or of Latin America, he excels as a historian who carefully reconstructs a topic that has not received sufficient scholarly attention so far. For anyone interested in Latin America’s relationship with the League of Nations, therefore, his book will doubtless be the standard reference for many years to come. For all the meticulous research presented in it and its nuanced and convincing interpretations, it is also remarkably well written. Fischer should thus be congratulated for having deftly filled an important gap in historical knowledge. One can only hope for an English translation to widen the book’s reception.