Die Änderung der russischen Verfassung 2020 – Auswirkungen auf die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit

Abstract

The Russian Constitution of 1993 was subjected to its most extensive revision in 2020. The primary purpose of the changes was to strengthen the role of the President of the Republic. In addition, the position of the Constitutional Court was also significantly modified. The various extensions of the Constitutional Court‘s powers can only superficially be classified as “strengthening” the court itself. In terms of “power politics” they primarily benefit the President. He can now dismiss constitutional judges without major procedural obstacles. In all the newly added competencies for preventive abstract normative control, the President is the only body entitled to file an application. In this respect, it is him who can influence and control legislation even more efficiently than before, and the Constitutional Court is realistically no more than its “auxiliary organ.” The fact that the Constitutional Court‘s position as a “defensive instance” against decisions of international courts has been strengthened leads to Russia‘s legal self-isolation and is likely to burden cooperation in international organizations. Other constitutional amendments may well be understood as “upgrading” the Constitutional Court or strengthening the constitutional state. This applies in particular to the considerable expansion of the objects of review in the procedure of individual constitutional complaints and in the procedure of concrete review of norms.