Die Machtposition des japanischen Regierungschefs

Abstract

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image sizeAbstractHow does the institutional setting in Japan affect the ability of prime ministers to exert power? An examination of institutional veto players within Japan's political system reveals that there are no exceptionally high constitutional barriers vis-à-vis majority government. Moreover, Japanese heads of government possess some powerful instruments such as the right to dissolve the Lower House and to appoint and dismiss ministers at will. The apparent weakness and passivity of many Japanese prime ministers in the post-war period can thus not be explained by reference to the formal institutional setting in which they have operated. Rather it has been informal institutions within the political system and the governing LDP—an internally segmented but relatively autonomous government bureaucracy, intensive factional competition plus institutionalised informal policy-making structures and processes within the governing party—which have constrained the ability of Japanese heads of governments to exert power. Recent administrative reforms involving an increase in institutional and personal resources available to Japanese prime ministers have, however, helped to shore up their power position. Prime minister Koizumi Jun'ichirō actively used these new resources in order to push his political agenda. Although he had to make concessions in view of still remaining informal institutions within his party, Koizumi acted very much like a ‚Westminster-style’ prime minister.