Die kartellrechtliche Beurteilung von Preisgleitklauseln als Ausprägung von Hub & Spoke Verhältnissen

Abstract

This dissertation is devoted to assessing price adjustment clauses in European competition law. In practice, such clauses often require the disclosure of sensitive market information by competitors to a common contractual partner. This disclosure of information can be a form of hub-and-spoke collusion. The extent to which a price adjustment clause falls under the prohibition of cartels in Art. 101 of the TFEU, and thus whether an agreement without any contact between competitors is possible, depends in particular on the definition of a concerted practice. Whether accidental and unintentional participation in the exchange of information should also fall within the scope of Art. 101 (1) of the TFEU is subject to discussion. The author argues for a nuanced assessment of conscious and unconscious indirect information exchange.