Abstract
This paper examines a deeply engrained intuition according to which the relation between concepts and perception is deeply problematic, because - so the intuition goes - our conceptual capacities are constitutively unable to match our perceptual capacities in fineness of grain. After some introductory remarks concerning the concept of a concept (1), I present the intuition and articulate the argument from fineness of grain that the intuition embodies (2). I go on to sketch the conception of a specific type of concept - a phenomenal concept - which is meant to show that the intuition is groundless, since our conceptual capacities are in a sense just as finely-grained as our perceptual capacities (3-5). I defend the conception against two arguments that purport to show that the putative phenomenal concepts would not be concepts at all, since they fail to accord with two necessary conditions on concepts, namely the generality constraint (6) and the shareability constraint (7). I argue that phenomenal concepts on my conception satisfy both conditions.
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