Abstract
This paper applied the distance to default (DD) measure to five mergers among large Japanese banks during the crisis period. The DD helps us analyze whether mergers that took place in the late 1990s and 2000s made the merged banks financially more robust, as intended. Our findings include: (1) A merged bank fundamentally inherits financial soundness of premerged banks, without incremental value from the merger; and (2) A negative DD was observed following the merger. The findings of this case study are consistent with the view that large Japanese banks’ mergers either failed to implement intended scale economies or were motivated by a belief in the too-big-to-fail policy.
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More From: Journal of the Japanese and International Economies
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