Did fiscal institutions affect Wagner’s law in Italy during 1951–2009 period? An empirical analysis

Abstract

In this article, we test Wagner’s assumption of the one-sided directional flow moving from economic growth to public spending in Italy for the 1951–2009 period. We pay particular attention to the impact of certain regime shifts related to changes in Italian budget regulations and procedures and the relevance of fiscal institutions to the fiscal performance equation, i.e. the public spending–national income nexus. The Error Correction Model is estimated to measure short-run dynamic effects and the long-run equilibrium between the two time series. The empirical evidence suggests that Wagner’s law is supported. In regard to policy implications, we find that public spending reacted less to positive changes in economic growth when the strengthening of the Ministry of Finance occurred in 1997 (Ciampi’s reform). Some sensitivity analyses confirm our empirical evidence.