Abstract
The successful prediction of new phenomena by scientific theories has gained much interest in philosophy. I will discuss a case that is often taken to be such a successful prediction within physics: Bose-Einstein condensation. The common story goes: the phenomenon was predicted in 1925 by Einstein, and the prediction was confirmed in 1995 at JILA and MIT. I will discuss the history of Bose-Einstein condensation and argue that the observations made in 1995 were inconceivable in several ways in 1925. Therefore, it stands to reason that this is not a story of a confirmed prediction, at least not in the common sense of “prediction”. I will suggest that it would be worthwhile for philosophers to investigate further into differences between types of predictions and the various roles those play in science.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
