Abstract
Under anarchy, uncoordinated competitive theft by "roving bandits" destroys the incentive to invest and produce, leaving little to be gamed by either the population or the bandits. Both would be better off if a bandit sets himself up as a dictator -a "stationary bandit" who monopolizes and rationalizes that theft in the form of taxes-. A secure autocrat has an encompassing interest in his domain that leads him to provide a peaceful order and other public goods that increase productivity. Whenever an autocrat expects a brief tenure, it pays him to confiscate those assets whose tax yield over his tenure is less than their total value. The incentive plus the inherent uncertainty of succession in dictatorships imply that autocracies rarely perform well economically for more than a generation. The conditions necessary for a lasting democracy are the same that are needed for the security of property and contract rights that generates economic growth.
Highlights
Bajo la anarqufa, el robo competitivo descoordinado que efectúan los "bandiáos merodeadores" destruye el incentivo para invertir y producir, dejando escaso margen para la poblaci6n o los bandidos
Whenever an autocrat expects a brief tenure, it pays him to confiscate those assets whose tax yield over his tenure is less than their total value
The cond1tions necessary for a lasting democracy are the same that are needed for the security of property and contract rights that generates econom ic growth
Summary
Podemos ahora empezar a reconciliar la observación penetrante del monárquico de la aldea y el argumento precedente con el asunto de la democracia. Lo tanto, ser correcto a menos que tenga en cuenta simultáneamente el incentivo del bandido estacionario para proporcionar bienes públicos, al mismo tiempo que extrae el mayor superávit neto posible para sí. Aunque las formas que ha tomado el bandidaje estacionario en el curso de la historia son diversas, la esencia del asunto puede verse asumiendo que el autócrata genera todos sus ingresos en forma de tributación explícita. El autócrata racional dedicará alguno de los recursos obtenidos mediante la tributación a bienes públicos, pero impondrá mayores tasas tributarias que las necesarias para pagar los mismos, ya que también utiliza los impuestos recaudados para maximizar su superávit neto. Cuanto más alta es la tasa tributaria -determinado el nivel de la provisión de bienes públicos- más bajo será el ingreso de la sociedad, ya que los impuestos distorsionan los incentivos. El Imperio Romano finalmente elevó sus tasas tributarias por lo menos hasta el nivel máximo de ingresos
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