Abstract

Batel and Castro's call for reopening the dialogue between the theory of social representations and discursive psychology is to be welcomed and indeed, somewhat long overdue. Despite the case that many scholars are engaging in the kind of rapprochement being advocated for by Batel and Castro, I argue here that the intellectual trajectory discursive psychology has taken during the last thirty years makes it less amenable to the kind of reconciliation called for by Batel and Castro. Two enduring tensions between the two theories that require resolution remain: (1) how we define discursive psychology as it is practised today and (2) the epistemological and ontological status of cognition.

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