Dewey's Rejection of Retributivism and His Moral‐Education Theory of Punishment

Abstract

This essay examines the two important arguments that John Dewey’s social philosophy offers against the retributivist justification for punishment. The first argument is that retributivism cannot serve as an adequate explanation for the moral practice of punishment, while the second argument develops the position that a liberally democratic society would naturally prefer an alternative to the retributive model of punishment that is more consistent with democracy’s concern for the social good. Although Dewey did not fully develop a systematic theory of punishment, his writings on morality, education, and democracy provide the foundations for constructing a Deweyan approach to the justification of punishment. The cornerstone is Dewey’s theory of moral education for a liberal democracy. This theory points the way toward an explanation of why and how society should aim at continually developing the moral responsibility of all citizens. In brief, punishment should play an essential role in moral education by enhancing the ability of offenders to be more socially responsible in the future. Examination of Dewey’s arguments against retributivism shows how he provides an alternative to both deontological and utilitarian approaches to punishment, thereby establishing a novel version of the moral-education theory of punishment.