Dewey's Political Technology from an Anthropological Perspective

Abstract

In this paper, I explore the possibility that John Dewey’s silence on the topic of what constitutes adequate political technology, or democratic means to achieve democratic ends, makes greater sense if we appreciate the notion of political technology from an anthropological perspective. Michael Eldridge relates the exchange between John Herman Randall, Jr., and Dewey in which Dewey concedes 'that I have done little or nothing in this direction [of outlining what constitutes adequate political technology, but that] does not detract from my recognition that in the concrete the invention of such a technology is the heart of the problem of intelligent action in political matters.' Dewey’s concession could be interpreted as an admission that he was working above his pay grade when asked to identify political machinery or institutions suitable for his vision of democracy as a way of life. Not being able to specify adequate means to achieve lofty democratic ends is not so problematic, however, if we appreciate the roots of Dewey’s work (especially Human Nature and Conduct) in the anthropological writings of Immanuel Kant and Franz Boas. For then experience reflects a myriad of social and cultural conditions and specifying explicit means to structure that experience risks stymieing the organic development of political practice. In short, Dewey did not want his ambitious democratic vision to outstrip the possibilities of practice, so he left the task of specifying exact political technology (or making it concrete) open.