Devil on the doorstep v. bandits in the backyard: Iranian and American theory-laden perceptions and judgements during three US-led Middle East operations

Abstract

ABSTRACT This article employs conceptual tools from the philosophy of science to shed new light on prolonged Iran-US hostility. Iranian and American elites evidently have negative attitudes towards the other nation, but these attitudes lack systematic and theoretical analysis. We apply the post-positivist concepts of theory-laden perception and judgement to anticipate the impact of established attitudes on foreign policy experts. After considering the cognitive training of each foreign policy community in the 1980s, the article hypothesises each group’s perceptions of and judgements about the other’s behaviour during Operation Desert Storm (1991), Operation Enduring Freedom (2001), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003). The concurrence of theory-laden judgements with each nation’s actual decisions indicates the likely contributions of American and Iranian foreign policy experts to the lack of substantial long-term bilateral cooperation, while the instance of a lack of concurrence indicates the possibility of future change. Our cross-disciplinary methodology demonstrates the utility of venturing outside the traditional boundaries of international relations scholarship.