“Deviants” and Democracy

Abstract

Punitive policy designs diminish felons as citizens. Scholars know much about the designs’ influence on felons’ political and civil rights. They know little of how policy influences felons’ social rights. Examining the discretion of states to retain or reform federal bans on drug felons receiving cash and food assistance between 1997 and 2004, we explain the choices states make about extending social rights to “deviants.” We draw from theories of neoinstitutional organization, group threat, and political incorporation. Multivariate analysis suggest that the severity of states’ penal regimes and the degree to which felons and poor people threaten social order have the greatest influence on states’ responses to the federal sanctions on drug felons. Our study informs understandings of why some states take a “punitive turn” while other states may counter convention, exercising discretion to reduce rather than increase their punitiveness toward felons specifically and lawbreaking generally.