Abstract

This work is a continuation of the series of articles dedicated to the genesis of lobbying in Russia. The article examines the specifics of the formation of the institution of lobbying from the moment of the collapse of the USSR to the present day. It is shown that the development of lobbying depended both on the transformations of the political system as well as on the changing norms of interaction between interest groups and the government. The development of lobbying over the past 30 years has passed through three stages: a chaotic period of structural transformations in 1991–1993, the stage of development of the democratic system and oligarchic economy in 1993–2003, the genesis of the vertical of power from 2003 to the present. Specifics of the institution of lobbying in Russia is determined by several key components. First, it is shaped by the interest groups system, which circles around large corporations and business associations. Second, lobbying is determined by the structure of power and decision making, with the President of the Russian Federation, the Administration of the President and the Government being major institutional stakeholders for lobbyists. Third, the development of lobbying depends on modes of interaction between interests groups and public officials which basically remains mostly in the shadows. A fundamental problem in the development of lobbying in Russia is that both the executive bodies and the parliament are closed, non-public power structures, access to which for external groups is generally not systematized. This leads to the elitist, oligarchic tendencies of lobbying means that only few privileged groups enjoy access to the decision-making system.

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