Abstract

AbstractInductive generalization (i.e., making generalizations from instances) is ubiquitous in human cognition. In the developmental literature, researchers have proposed two theoretical accounts of this important process: a naïve theory account and a similarity‐based account. However, neither of these theoretical accounts explains marked developmental changes in inductive generalization with familiar categories that have been documented in prior research. In this article, I describe briefly a revised version of the similarity‐based account of inductive generalization that can explain individual variability as well as developmental change in inductive generalization with familiar categories. I also highlight several unresolved issues in the study of development of inductive generalization.

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