Abstract

The paper focuses on security in industrial control systems. Numerous protocols and their incompatibility are undermining the security design. Also, the IEC 61850 standard focuses on these issues. In detail, it deals with the compatibility between protocols and, partly, security. In the context of this work, a testbed together with the traffic generator for IEC 61850 standard and its three main parts – MMS (Manufacturing Message Specification), GOOSE (Generic Object-Oriented Substation Events), and Sampled Values - are designed. Additionally, the used generator is compared with an example of RTU (Remote Terminal Unit) used in standard ICS (Industrial Control Systems) networks. The last part of this work consists of the performance testing of the implemented protocols (MMS, GOOSE, and Sampled Values).

Highlights

  • The management of nowadays industrial operations is taken over by operational technologies (OT)

  • The major segment within operational technology is comprised of industrial control systems (ICS, often referred as Industrial Automated Systems - IAS or Industrial Automation and Control System - IACS), which include systems for monitoring and controlling industrial processes, such as oil refinery, power consumption on electricity grids, alarms from building information systems or generally mission-critical applications with a high availability requirement

  • ICS are divided into two main parts: (i) programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and (ii) discrete control systems (DCS), which use PLC or some other batch process control device

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Summary

INTRODUCTION

The management of nowadays industrial operations is taken over by operational technologies (OT). The ICS systems are often used in critical industry to control facilities, i.e., hydro-power plants, nuclear power plants, distribution and water treatment facilities, and other facilities with a significant impact on society. These highly interconnected systems are called critical infrastructure (CI) [3] because they have a significant impact on national assets, the basic living needs, and facilities of the population or the public health. The networking devices and SCADA devices together contain nearly 50 % of the identified vulnerabilities This underlines the importance of concentrating on the communication part of the cyber-physical systems involved in OT and ICS.

RELATED WORK
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
TESTBED ENVIRONMENT DESCRIPTION
CYBER-PHYSICAL TESTBED WITH IEC61850 ARCHITECTURE
Description of IEC 61850
Generator Structure
Performance Testing of the Testbed
Findings
CONCLUSIONS
Full Text
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