Abstract

The Physical Protection System is based on the five basic security functions (deterrence, detection, delay, response, and security management), all of which are required to protect a radiological facility against malicious acts. Evaluating the performance of PPS, including the security procedures and their implementation, is a way to engage with staff, raise their awareness on the importance of security. This article presents a new effectiveness evaluation model of the PPS administrative structure through qualitative analysis, which is appropriate for the security management evaluation of low-consequence radiological facilities, to protect them against malicious acts. This model was developed in five stages to obtain a structured process for conducting the PPS administrative structure evaluation, based on the security management function, consisting of 11 topics and 89 qualitative questions to determine the Relative Robustness Index of this function. Model topics were classified with distinct relative weights based on their relevance to the PPS. For testing and validation of the model, 6 industrial radiological facilities classified in different security levels were selected. The results showed that the self-assessment model proposed in this article is viable, considering its simplicity, promptness, and applicability in identifying and analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the PPS security management function. The new model made possible the effectiveness evaluation of the PPS globally and punctually, making it possible to identify which topics of security management are above, or below, the minimum required for the current security level.

Highlights

  • We present the result of applying the MAESP, starting with the analysis of the questions formulation designed to identify inconsistencies in the questionnaire, followed by the analysis of the calculated results obtained from the answers from the radiological facilities, following the sequence presented in the structured process for effectiveness evaluation of the Physical Protection System (PPS) (Figure 5)

  • The Physical Protection System is composed of a physical structure capable of preventing radiological sabotage and/or unauthorized removal of a radioactive source present in the radiological facility, this system must be complemented by an administrative structure, conducted by the security management function, which establishes the general policies, plans and procedures for the implementation of physical protection, integration of people, procedures and equipment, and promoting a strong security culture at the facility, in order to guarantee the effectiveness and sustainability of the PPS

  • The new model allowed evaluating the effectiveness of the PPS in a global and punctual way, giving the evaluator the possibility to identify which topics of security management are above, or below, the minimum necessary for the current security level, enabling the decision making to provide a balance of the facility’s actual physical protection measures, using as a basis the measures listed in Appendix I

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Summary

INTRODUCTION

The growing concern of the international community relating to the nuclear security of radioactive sources and associated facilities after September 11th, 2001 resulted in a strengthening, at world level, of the application of physical protection requirements for radioactive sources, associated facilities and associated activities through the adoption of new parameters and methodologies for the design and implementation of physical protection measures and systems [1]. The PPS is based on the five basic security functions (deterrence, detection, delay, response, and security management), all of which are required to protect a radiological facility against malicious acts [6,7]. The PPS that are designed to protect high-value critical assets generally require a quantitative analysis. The quantitative analysis is often used in nuclear power plants (NPP) and other critical facilities to evaluate the PPS effectiveness, such evaluation models are complex, as they require tools and computer simulations. This article presents a new effectiveness evaluation model of the PPS administrative structure, Physical Protection System Effectiveness Evaluation Model (MAESP - in the Portuguese acronym), through qualitative analysis, which is appropriate for the security management evaluation of radiological facilities, including medical and industrial facilities, to protect them against malicious acts

BASES FOR DEVELOPING THE EVALUATION MODEL
Stage 1
Stage 2
Stage 3
Stage 4
Stage 5
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Results and Relative
CONCLUSIONS
Is there a written access authorization policy?
Is there a visitor access control implemented?
Evaluation
Would employees report suspicious behavior by employees and contractors?
Are physical protection responsibilities clearly defined in the PPP?
Are devices tested at the frequency recommended by the manufacturer?
Has the organization developed information security procedures that
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