Development in moral judgment research.

Abstract

Two recent articles challenge cognitive developmental interpretations given to moral judgment research using preference data. One article suggests that preference data may reflect preference for language sophistication rather than for levels of moral reasoning. The other article suggests that preference for statements of moral reasoning may reflect a prior commitment to an action choice rather than an evaluation of moral reasoning. The evidence in both articles is critiqued, subsequent research dealing with the problems raised is cited, and a reconceptualization of the issues is recommended. Moran and Joniak (1979) recently proposed that preference for moral statements as reported in Rest, Turiel, and Kohlberg (1969) and Rest (1973) is an artifact of language sophistication, not a preference for different stages of moral reasoning. Moran and Joniak based their argument on the following study. They wrote six stage-pro to typic statements, two at Stage 2 and four at Stage 4. Two of the Stage 4 statements were written in language (i.e., language used by actual subjects who were quoted in Kohlberg, Note 1), and the other statements (two Stage 4 and two Stage 2) were written in language (i.e., language using more complex syntax and more technical words). Subjects presented with the choice between inflated Stage 2 statements and conversational Stage 4 statements showed a preference for the Stage 2 statements; subjects presented with the choice between inflated Stage 2 and inflated Stage 4 statements showed about equal preference. Moran and Joniak concluded that preference for moral statements is more closely associated with language sophistication than with stage of moral reasoning,