Development and management of new products: Jean-Marie Choffray and Françoise Dorey McGraw-Hill, Paris, 1983, 156 pp

Abstract

Private sector participation in municipal solid waste (MSW) management is increasingly being applied in many countries recently. However, it remains a largely unexplored issue whether different self-interested treatment operators can co-exist in an economically feasible and sustainable manner. To help the policy-maker s understand and manage competitive MSW treatment systems, this paper proposes an agent-based waste treatment model (AWTM) that consists of four types of agents, namely the refuse collector, specialized treatment unit (STU), the general treatment unit (GTU), and the regulator. An estimation-and-optimization approach is developed for profit-maximizing agents to set optimal gate fee and vie for specific waste in low-information competition. Based on the Singapore case, the experimental results imply that if the regulator deliberately promotes the STUs by intervening in waste allocation, the GTU could give up competing for the waste and greatly increase its gate fees as retaliation. Besides, driven by the increasing gate fee of the GTU, the STUs conservatively raise their gate fee; while the GTU will be the major beneficiary in the AWTM. Finally, to identify the optimal mixed policy under predefined constraints, the AWTM is integrated into a simulation-based optimization problem, which is solved by a genetic algorithm.