Developing New-to-the-Firm Products: The Role of Micropolitical Strategies

Abstract

This research addresses three questions: (1) To what extent do new-to-the-firm products (with market and technology newness) face resistance in winning approval for development during the review process? (2) To what degree does product development teams’ use of micropolitical strategies help reduce resistance and get approval with minimum compromise in the product? (3) To what extent do some of these micropolitical strategies harm the new product's performance? The findings suggest that products with both market and technology newness encounter resistance in getting approval for development. If the product development team wants to reduce resistance to products with market newness, it needs to build a coalition of supporters that can help it during the review process. Similarly, if the team seeks to minimize resistance to products with technology newness, it should frame the product in terms of the firms’ existing products, strategies, and competitive thrusts. However, such framing increases resistance to market newness. If products continue to be resisted, they must be compromised (i.e., modified as a concession) to win approval. If the team wants to reduce the degree of compromise, it should initially develop the product in hiding. Products that are compromised perform poorly in the marketplace.