Abstract
Much recent effort has been put into developing effective electronic markets. However, the research has mainly focused on institutional trust-building mechanisms. Practically, sellers lack guidelines in shaping competitive edges in electronic markets where institutional mechanisms have been applied to all sellers. In order to fill this gap, we examine the impacts of institutional and social mechanisms on seller differentiation, drawing from quality signaling theories in economics. Hierarchical regression analysis of the objective data crawled from TaoBao.com reveals these two competing categories of quality signal mechanisms result in interesting seller differentiation. Findings, implications and future research are discussed.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
