Deux théâtres, un même conflit ? Le poids de l'Union française sur l'intégration atlantique 1952-1956

Abstract

This study begins with striking the geopolitical balance in Europe of the French Indochinese war within the framework of the Cold War. On one side, France needs an independent expeditionary force to remain a World power during the 1950's. On the other side, ECD or NATO require to keep important French field forces on the European soil, since the EDC Agreements and then the London Agreements assign 12 divisions to West Germany. Therefore, each theatre of operations is ambiguous and source of misunderstandings with the Atlantic allies of France, especially United States and Great Britain. On one end, the Indochinese conflict is as much a colonial struggle (inconsistent with American liberalism), as a primary Cold War issue in which however the United States subsidize the French overseas forces ($ 1,1 billion for 1953-1954). In Europe, the main threat remains of course the USSR whereas the French skeptical opinion still watches over Germany with anxiety. That explains the basic indecision of the legislative branch (Assemblée nationale ), and of the shaky governments of the IVth Republic. Just after Diên Biên Phu (Laniel Government), the Mendès France Government fails to obtain the ratification of ECD. It means very difficult relations between France and the other members of NATO about the French taking part in the common effort. The financial strain on French budget (because of Vietnam), chronic inflation, and now the Algerian crisis (11/1/1954) imperil the national outlay on armaments. Moreover, Algeria absorbs at least the two thirds of the home army with its NATO equipment, also subsidized by the United States (1952-1955). This material deficit and strategical breach in the integrated Atlantic command provoke growing tensions. We will analyze the reactions of the French high command, and its attempts to define a military disposition in harmony with the overseas needs, the heavy budget deficits and the NATO requirements. We will especially concentrate on the chaotic fate of the Yellow Plan (1954-1955) and of the Orange Plan (1956-1958), proposed by the general staff and the French Minister of Defence in order to reorganize the land forces.