Abstract

It was an imbalance in the conventional power that forced Pakistan to see nuclear weapons' capability, as a deterrence against India, after the war of 1971 that resulted in separation of former East Pakistan. This is the context of ‘deterrence’ in today's South Asia. The only solution to the dilemmas created by the region's nuclearization is to engage seriously and constructively to build a better understanding of each other's conventional and nuclear policies, doctrines, and postures, and meaningful CBMs both in nuclear and conventional military spheres to build trust and confidence. Both India and Pakistan have to maintain rational decision-making to ensure the credibility of their deterrence and to achieve the objective of maintaining stability.

Highlights

  • [It was an imbalance in the conventional power that forced Pakistan to see nuclear weapons’ capability, as a deterrence against India, after the war of 1971 that resulted in separation of former East Pakistan

  • A state of nuclear deterrence based upon each side's assured strike capabilities and doctrinal postures has established; but its credibility has been recognized by both the South Asian rivals, even though both India and Pakistan have varying interpretations and

  • A few exceptions exist in the form of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) capable of reaching Israel; a country known for its own undeclared nuclear capability, surveillance activities in Pakistan, and which is said to have made plans to attack Pakistani nuclear installations with Indian support in 1983.32 The following tables show the missile inventories of both Pakistan and India, with NTI estimates on their payloads and ranges

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Summary

Ahmad Khan and Ali Ahsan*

Abstract [It was an imbalance in the conventional power that forced Pakistan to see nuclear weapons’ capability, as a deterrence against India, after the war of 1971 that resulted in separation of former East Pakistan. The only solution to the dilemmas created by the region’s nuclearization is to engage seriously and constructively to build a better understanding of each other’s conventional and nuclear policies, doctrines, and postures, and meaningful CBMs both in nuclear and conventional military spheres to build trust and confidence Both India and Pakistan have to maintain rational decision-making to ensure the credibility of their deterrence and to achieve the objective of maintaining stability. Deterrence has in general altered the strategic dynamics in South Asia as it averts the chance of an all-out war and erode the consequence of conventional military discrepancy, and last but not the least, constrains the strategic rivalry to very little and minor intensity conflicts and crises This fact is well noted here that besides very weak relations in every discipline both countries have the latest missile system, including ballistic missiles and are spending a major part of their budgets on defence, which allow them to critically raise the bar of nuclear deterrence. Khurshid Khan, "Deterrence Stability, Security Doctrines and Escalation Control in South Asia," IPRI Journal XIII, no. 2 (Summer 2013): 51

Maintaining a Credible Minimum Deterrence
North Korea
Capacity tons of Heavy
Missile Development Programs
Name Series Missile
Dhanush deployed
Space Programs
Pakistan Nuclear Doctrine
Command and Control in South Asia and TNWs
Conclusions
Full Text
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