Deterrence in Europe in the 1970s

Abstract

I the great domed Capitol building in Washington, treading the beautifully carpeted Senate floor, the scholarly Mike Mansfield from Montana holds sway as Majority Leader of the United States Senate. He is a beloved and respected Majority Leader if ever there was one. He would like to see the United State well out of Vietnam, our defence budget reduced, our military manpower cut, our balance of payments deficit turned into a surplus, and our national security (and that of our allies, if possible) maintained. Very few men or women of influence in Washington would argue these points with Senator Mansfield. Yet last year the Senate voted twice, by very large margins, to reject the Mansfield proposal to cut U.S. troops in Europe to a token level. A token level would have served as a trip-wire, whose sensitivity to a Soviet incursion would—theoretically—set off a massive reflow of U.S. force towards Europe, possibly even an intercontinental ballistic missile strike on the U.S.S.R. itself. Mansfield's proposal relies to some degree on that strategic concept; the prevailing votes against it were to some degree a repudiation of that concept.