Abstract
ABSTRACT Strategic stability can mitigate the security dilemma that mutual deterrence efforts produce. If two parties agree on what the most destabilising peacetime or wartime behaviour is, they are more likely to agree on risk-reduction measures. However, contemporary security actors rarely share views of what constitutes destabilising behaviour, given political disagreements and asymmetries in deterrent measures due to varying military capabilities, technology adaptations and threat perceptions. This paper examines the deterrence dynamics between NATO and Russia, demonstrating how asymmetric views of strategic stability add potential security dilemmas to the already-severe political confrontation between them.
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