Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy

Abstract

Nuclear deterrence and coercive diplomacy must form an integrated part of any discussion of air power. This chapter examines the use of air power as an instrument of strategic coercion: a means of deterring attack or compelling an enemy to surrender or to comply with other coercive demands. From its earlier days, air power’s advocates argued that the ability to strike directly at the centres of an adversary’s strength without first having to defeat its armed forces in the field would fundamentally transform warfare, making it possible to win faster and less expensive victories. This promise has often gone unfulfilled, yet in some cases aerial coercion has far outpaced expectations. The author summarises basic elements of coercion, including the distinction between punishment and denial strategies. He also discusses the historical and recent use of air power in two coercive roles: deterrence through the use of nuclear and other apocalyptic punitive threats, and compulsion through conventional bombing. The chapter concludes with a call for the retirement of the timeworn and policy-irrelevant question of whether air power can win wars alone, and argues that in the contemporary strategic setting, deterrence has once again emerged as the principal role of air power.