Determined by Reasons: A Competence Account of Acting for a Normative Reason , by Susanne Mantel

Abstract

People do all kinds of things for reasons. Sometimes, if we’re lucky, they do things for good reasons. But what is it to do something for a good reason? And what are these reasons that move us to act? In her excellent first monograph, Susanne Mantel seeks to answer these questions. In the course of doing so, she offers a novel theory of what it is to act for a good reason and challenges some popular assumptions about the ontology of reasons. These assumptions, she thinks, stand in the way of a proper understanding of the ontology of motivating reasons. In this review, I shall discuss the two parts of her book and then raise some general questions about her proposals and about the place of reasons in our normative theories. Let me say at the outset that there is much to like about this book. Her discussion is packed with arguments. Her proposals are original and insightful. I think that her account of basing should shed light on a number of outstanding problems in epistemology, the philosophy of action, and ethical theory. I can recommend this unreservedly to anyone with interests in these areas.