Abstract
There is a large body of research dealing with top management compensation from an agency theory perspective. Difficulties in monitoring top management (the agent) are exacerbated in the multinational corporation, where there are significant information asymmetries between headquarters and foreign subsidiaries. Headquarters may use variable pay for subsidiary top managers to reduce the agency problems. By studying 110 foreign-owned subsidiaries located in Finland, this paper attempts to identify determinants of variable pay to the subsidiary general manager. In line with agency theory, the results suggest that the roles played by the subsidiary influence the compensation strategy used for the subsidiary general manager. However, while agency theory predicts that the cultural distance beween the home country of the multinational corporation and the location of the foreign subsidiary would have an effect on the compensation system, no such effect was found. Instead, in accordance with the institutionalization perspective, we found a significant 'nationality effect' on the use of variable pay.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: The International Journal of Human Resource Management
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
