Abstract
We investigate the issue of whose interest is reflected in selecting the size of public service broadcasting (PSB). We examine two different approaches: (1) the public interest theory, where PSB size is selected to maximise citizens' welfare and, (2) the public choice theory, where PSB size is determined by self-interested politicians. Based on the foundations of these two views, we derive theoretical predictions about how PSB size changes with an increase in political competition. Then, we test these predictions using panel data from OECD countries over the period 1993-2010, and we find that electoral intensity is negatively associated with PSB size. We conclude that PSB size does not reflect the public interest theory, but rather upholds the public choice theory, especially the politicians' rent-seeking motive.
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