Abstract
A panel study of over 100 countries from 1960 to 1995 finds that improvements in the standard of living predict increase in democracy, as measured by a subjective indicator of electoral rights. The propensity for democracy rises with per capita GDP, primary schooling, and a smaller gap between male and female primary attainment. For a given standard of living, democaracy tends to fall with urbnization and with a greater reliance on natrual resources. Democracy has little relation to country size but rises with the middle‐class share of income. The apparently strong relation of democracy to colonial heritage mostly disappears when the economic variables are held constant. Similarly, the allowance for these economic variables weakens the interplay between democracy and religious affiliation. However, negative effects from Muslim and non‐religious affiliations remain intact.
Highlights
For a given standard of living, democracy tends to fall with urbanization and with a greater reliance on natural resources
A dummy for oil-exporting countries, as designated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF),7 is included as a rough adjustment of GDP for the contribution of natural resources
The idea here is that the income generated from natural resources such as oil may create less pressure for democratization than income associated with the accumulation of human and physical capital
Summary
The main definition of democracy in the present study is a narrow one that focuses on the role of elections. A related variable from Bollen (1990) is used for 1960 and 1965.1 The Freedom House concept of electoral rights uses the following basic definition: ‘‘Political rights are rights to participate meaningfully in the political process In a democracy this means the right of all adults to vote and compete for public office, and for elected representatives. The dotted line shows that the average of the indicator in subSaharan Africa peaked at 0.58 in 1960 (26 countries) and (for 43 countries) fell to low points of 0.19 in 1977 and 0.18 in 1989 before rising to 0.40 in 1995 This pattern emerges because many of the African countries began with ostensibly democratic institutions when they became independent in the early 1960s, but most evolved into one-party dictatorships by the early 1970s. This high degree of correlation does not apply if the indexes of electoral rights and civil liberties are compared with measures of property rights and legal structure, such as Knack and Keefer’s (1995) indicator for maintenance of the rule of law, which is used in the subsequent analysis
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