Abstract
Measurement-device-independent entanglement witness (MDI-EW) plays an important role for detecting entanglement with untrusted measurement device. We present a double blinding-attack on a quantum secret sharing (QSS) protocol based on GHZ state. Using the MDI-EW method, we propose a QSS protocol against all detector side-channels. We allow source flaws in practical QSS system, so that Charlie can securely distribute a key between the two agents Alice and Bob over long distances. Our protocol provides condition on the extracted key rate for the secret against both external eavesdropper and arbitrary dishonest participants. A tight bound for collective attacks can provide good bounds on the practical QSS with source flaws. Then we show through numerical simulations that using single-photon source a secure QSS over 136 km can be achieved.
Highlights
Quantum secret sharing (QSS) is a multiparty protocol[1,2,3,4] to distribute a secret to a network of players, each of whom is allowed to access a share of the secret
It was claimed that a quantum secret sharing (QSS) procedure can be securely implemented using GHZ state[3], we find out it is potentially vulnerable to a double blinding-attack by exploiting controllability of single-photon avalanche-photodiode-based detectors of both Alice and Bob instead of one[5]
Following a similar spirit to DDI-quantum key distribution (QKD), we propose a detector-device-independent quantum secret sharing (DDI-QSS) protocol against all detector side-channels
Summary
The bit flip procedure would not change the above parameters, and would be public in classical communication The symmetry of this protocol implies they can bound Eve’s information by restricting to collective attacks such that the ( ) initial quantum state ρAvB can be transformed into a Bell-diagonal state[21]. Compared with the postselected GHZ states scheme[12], we obtain a long distribution distance among Alice, Bob and Charlie for practical QSS with the source flaws. After Alice and Bob announce the measurement results, Charlie calculates the BSM probability corresponding to three basis. A secure key can finnally be distilled with some practical sources only if we know the lower bound of the fraction of those raw bits contributed solely by the single-photon state components. In a model with one PDC source in the middle, it would be interesting to explore whether the decoy-state method will accurately and efficiently verify such a bound
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