Abstract

We study a binary hypothesis testing problem in which a defender must decide whether a test sequence has been drawn from a given memoryless source , while an attacker strives to impede the correct detection. With respect to previous works, the adversarial setup addressed in this paper considers an attacker who is active under both hypotheses, namely, a fully active attacker, as opposed to a partially active attacker who is active under one hypothesis only. In the fully active setup, the attacker distorts sequences drawn both from and from an alternative memoryless source , up to a certain distortion level, which is possibly different under the two hypotheses, to maximize the confusion in distinguishing between the two sources, i.e., to induce both false positive and false negative errors at the detector, also referred to as the defender. We model the defender–attacker interaction as a game and study two versions of this game, the Neyman–Pearson game and the Bayesian game. Our main result is in the characterization of an attack strategy that is asymptotically both dominant (i.e., optimal no matter what the defender’s strategy is) and universal, i.e., independent of and . From the analysis of the equilibrium payoff, we also derive the best achievable performance of the defender, by relaxing the requirement on the exponential decay rate of the false positive error probability in the Neyman–Pearson setup and the tradeoff between the error exponents in the Bayesian setup. Such analysis permits characterizing the conditions for the distinguishability of the two sources given the distortion levels.

Highlights

  • Signal processing techniques are routinely applied in the great majority of security-oriented applications

  • One of the main results of this paper is the characterization of an attack strategy that is both dominant, and universal, i.e., independent of the underlying sources

  • Theorem 1 states that, whenever an adversary aims at maximizing a payoff function of the form Equation (5), and as long as the defense strategy is confined to the analysis of the first-order statistics, the optimal attack strategy is universal with respect to the sources P0 and P1, i.e., it depends neither on P0 nor on P1

Read more

Summary

Introduction

Signal processing techniques are routinely applied in the great majority of security-oriented applications. The attacker is subjected to a distortion constraint, which limits his freedom in doing so Such a struggle between the defender and the attacker is modeled in [11] as a competitive zero-sum game; the asymptotic equilibrium, i.e., the equilibrium when the length of the observed sequence tends to infinity, is derived under the assumption that the defender bases his decision on the analysis of first-order statistics only. The optimal attack is the same for both the Neyman–Pearson and Bayesian games This result continues to hold for the partially active case, marking a significant difference with respect to previous works [11,13], where the existence of a dominant strategy wasestablished with regard to the defender only.

Notation and Definitions
Basics of Game Theory
Problem Formulation
Definition of the Neyman–Pearson and Bayesian Games
Asymptotically Dominant and Universal Attack
The Neyman–Pearson Detection Game
Optimal Detection and Game Equilibrium
Payoff at the Equilibrium
The Bayesian Detection Game
Optimal Defense and Game Equilibrium
Equilibrium Payoff
Source Distinguishability
Findings
Concluding Remarks
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call