Detecting cheaters

Abstract

Successful scientific theories are those that have survived repeated attempts to falsify them, make detailed and novel predictions about previously unobserved phenomena that are subsequently confirmed, predict new observations that falsify rival theories, fit coherently and even deductively with other established theories, and economically account for large bodies of known phenomena. A number of evolutionary psychological hypotheses have met all the criteria of successful scientific theories, including our proposal that the human mind contains (1) an evolved neurocognitive system that is functionally specialized for reasoning about social exchange, with a subroutine for detecting cheaters (social contract theory (SCT) [ 1 Cosmides L. Tooby J. Neurocognitive adaptations designed for social exchange. in: Buss D.M. Evolutionary Psychology Handbook. Wiley, 2005 Google Scholar , 2 Cosmides L. The logic of social exchange: has natural selection shaped how humans reason? Studies with the Wason selection task. Cognition. 1989; 31: 187-276 Crossref PubMed Scopus (1328) Google Scholar , 3 Cosmides L. Tooby J. Cognitive adaptations for social exchange. in: Barkow J. Cosmides L. Tooby J. The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture. Oxford University Press, 1992 Google Scholar , 4 Cosmides L. Tooby J. The cognitive neuroscience of social reasoning. in: Gazzaniga M.S. The New Cognitive Neurosciences. 2nd Edn. MIT Press, 2000: 1259-1270 Google Scholar , 5 Stone V. et al. Selective impairment of reasoning about social exchange in a patient with bilateral limbic system damage. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 2002; 99: 11531-11536 Crossref PubMed Scopus (154) Google Scholar , 6 Fiddick, L., Spampinato, M.V. and Grafman, J. Social contracts and precautions activate different neurological systems: an fMRI investigation of deontic reasoning. NeuroImage (in press) Google Scholar , 7 Fiddick L. Domains of deontic reasoning: resolving the discrepancy between the cognitive and moral reasoning literatures. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 2004; 57A: 447-474 Crossref Scopus (58) Google Scholar , 8 Fiddick L. Cosmides L. Tooby J. No interpretation without representation: the role of domain-specific representations and inferences in the Wason selection task. Cognition. 2000; 77: 1-79 Crossref PubMed Scopus (193) Google Scholar ]), and (2) an evolved neurocognitive system that is specialized for reasoning about precautions in hazardous situations (hazard management theory (HMT) [ 8 Fiddick L. Cosmides L. Tooby J. No interpretation without representation: the role of domain-specific representations and inferences in the Wason selection task. Cognition. 2000; 77: 1-79 Crossref PubMed Scopus (193) Google Scholar ]). By contrast, the Buller–Fodor counterhypothesis, constructed post hoc to retrodict a small subset of our results, has been repeatedly and decisively falsified by many researchers over the past fifteen years. These diverse experimental falsifications (which Buller fails to disclose [ 9 Buller D.J. Evolutionary psychology: the emperor's new paradigm. Trends Cogn. Sci. 2005; 9: 277-283 Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (61) Google Scholar ]) are not hidden in obscure sources, but are prominently featured in publications that Buller cites on other points. Specifically: