Deskriptions- und Interpretationsprobleme beim psychologischen Erklären

Abstract

Abstract In this paper, the descriptive information contained in empirical laws is contrasted with common-sense descriptions of situations and behavior. According to the Hempel-Oppenheim-Schema, explanation is, essentially, conceived as a matter of deductive reasoning in which the fact to be explained is subsumed under one (or more) empirically valid generalizations or laws. However, this kind of explanation is necessarily based on intuitive processes of diagnosis and interpretation. It is argued that these intuitive processes enable the scientist to formulate descriptive sentences which form the arguments of logically correct explanations. It is assumed that people produce common-sense descriptions of situation and behavior in correspondence with their subjective experience of other people's behavior and its determinants. In order to obtain intuitively adequate empirical generalizations and behavioral laws it is proposed that common-sense descriptions of behavior and situations should be integrated into the antecedent and/or consequent of laws. In such a research strategy the regularities between meaningfully interpreted situational and behavioral aspects can be studied.