Desiring to Try: Reply to Adams

Abstract

My argument involved a case in which 'Brett promises to pay Belton fifty dollars' for trying to solve a certain mate-in-two chess problem within five minutes. To preempt 'the objection that Belton will want to solve the problem, because only his discovering the solution can guarantee that Brett will deem him to have tried/ I supposed that 'Belton is convinced that Brett is psychic (or omniscient) and can tell whether he has tried, independently of Belton's succeeding' (252).2 1 observed that if and when Belton does try to solve the puzzle, there is a sense in which 'mating the king which is solving the puzzle (provided that it is accomplished in two moves) is a goal in Belton's thinking about chess moves.' But, I argued, the suppositions that Belton wants to try to solve the puzzle (or wants to try to figure out how to mate the king in two moves) and that he acts on that want do not entail that this goal is desired (or wanted; I