Designing Democratic Institutions: Legitimacy and the Reform of the Council of the European Union in the Lisbon Treaty

Abstract

The widely perceived ‘democratic deficit’ of the Eu ropean Union has spawned a major debate among scholars and politicians with featured prominently in the discussions leading to the Lisbon treaty. Ev en though at first glance the European Union’s (EU) in stitutional set-up is in line with democratic pract ice at the national level, its policies do not seem to enjoy the same level of legitimacy as those in nati onal political systems. Because the EU has a growing inf luence on the lives of European citizens, increasin g the legitimacy of its policies has assumed high pri ority on the agenda of European political elites. O ne of the explicit goals of the treaty reform process leading to the Lisbon treaty was to address this shortcoming of the Union. The envisaged reform was meant to take up the ‘democratic challenge’ and bring Europe closer to its citizens according to th e Laeken Declaration, which set the agenda for a Convention on the Future of Europe. The Convention was charged with preparing a new treaty and set out to write a constitution for the EU. In the even t, a somewhat less ambitious new treaty, the Lisbon treaty, was adopted. One of the main topics raised by the debate was the reform of legislative decisio nmaking in the Council. The Council is a key body in the legislative process as all legislative proposa ls need the consent of the Council to become law.