Designing Buy-Online-and-Pick-Up-in-Store (BOPS) Contract of Dual-Channel Low-Carbon Supply Chain considering Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preference

Yang Zhang,Bing Xu,Jingyi Li

doi:10.1155/2020/7476019

Abstract

Nowadays, buy-online-and-pick-up-in-store (BOPS) is a popular sales project to promote product sales. Implementing BOPS in the dual-channel low-carbon supply chain (DLSC) can not only improve low-carbon manufacturers’ profit but also reduce energy consumption in it. This paper focuses on how to design the contract which can ensure the implementation of BOPS in the DLSC consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer considering consumers’ low-carbon preference. Based on the analysis of game theory, two kinds of BOPS contract (MW contract with the dominant manufacturer making decision on wholesale price and RW contract with the dominant retailer making decision on wholesale price) with fixed compensation are designed and compared to obtain the better contract which is more effective on the implementation of BOPS. The findings show that MW contract is better than RW contract for the DLSC to implement BOPS. When consumers’ low-carbon preference and BOPS preference and the anti-cross-price elasticity are high enough, the DLSC can implement BOPS under the MW contract because it has Pareto efficiency on the profit of the original DLSC. We further find the sales price is decreasing in consumers’ low-carbon preference and anti-cross-price elasticity, while the wholesale price is increasing in consumers’ low-carbon preference. Finally, the results are verified by numerical examples.

Highlights

Introduction e Special Report on theOcean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate recently published by e Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s has brought global warming to the world’s attention once again. e report claims that global warming has led to widespread shrinking of the cryosphere, with mass loss from ice sheets and glaciers, and increased permafrost temperature over the last decades [1]. e report calls for urgent and ambitious emission reductions coupled with coordinated, sustained, and increasingly ambitious adaptation actions
Given that the MW contract is better, we continue to compare the profit of the BOPS supply chain with the dual-channel low-carbon supply chain (DLSC) under the MW contract to analyze its Pareto efficiency
Because the anti-cross-price elasticity has a complex effect on the total profit of the BOPS supply chain and the DLSC, the value of n is divided into two discrete cases with low anti-cross-price elasticity (n 0.1) and high anti-cross-price elasticity (n 1) to simplify the analysis without loss of generality

Summary

Basic Models

In order to focus on the effect of implementing BOPS, we let the operating costs for both the manufacturer and the retailer equal to zero In this case, the manufacturer’s profit πdeou and the retailer’s profit πdbou are as follows: πdeou pe + me􏼁ddeou + wddbou,. Given the manufacturer occupies a dominant position in the market generally [51], it is assumed that the manufacturer and the retailer in the DLSC play a Stackelberg game with complete information as follows: the manufacturer makes decisions on the wholesale price w and direct selling price pe, and the retailer makes decisions on retail price pb I e/bops/b represents the online/BOPS/ offline channel, respectively, and j dou/mw/rw represents the DLSC/MW contract/RW contract model, respectively

Price Decision Model of DLSC

Case 1

Case 2

Findings

Case 3