Abstract

In the integrated circuits (ICs) life cycle, malicious modifications of system components in the design houses or foundries have emerged as a major security threat and is popularly known as Hardware Trojan attacks. In general, such Hardware Trojans are very stealthy in nature and are therefore, very difficult to detect, even during the manufacturing test. In this work, we have started with the design of a Hardware Trojan that affects the system performance by intervening the cache replacement policy in a Many-core system, and we have subsequently approached toward the final objective of devising a low-cost countermeasure to thwart the attack.

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