Abstract
Social responsibility is essential to the sustainable development of megaprojects. A transparent and symmetrical information-sharing mechanism is an important guarantee for promoting megaproject stakeholders to fulfill their social responsibilities and improve project efficiency. Aiming at the problems of megaproject subcontractors concealing social responsibility information, which leads to unsmooth information channels and low project efficiency, this paper compares and analyzes the single-stage revenue-sharing model under symmetric and asymmetric information from the perspective of incentive contract design. Then, a two-stage incentive contract with multiple indicators under asymmetric information is designed using principal-agent theory. The research results show that the social responsibility effort level of the general contractor and the total project revenue is positively correlated with the input–output ratio, and is negatively correlated with the degree of information opacity of the subcontractor’s social responsibility. Incentive contracts with multiple indicators in stages can effectively encourage subcontractors to disclose social responsibility information, and reduce information asymmetry, therefore enhancing social responsibility and improving overall project efficiency. This research transforms the research on the social responsibility of megaprojects from qualitative to quantitative. The research results provide theoretical methods and decision-making basis for megaproject general contractors to encourage subcontractors to improve social responsibility.
Highlights
IntroductionIn the context of the Belt and Road Initiative and the national strategy for sustainable development, China’s major infrastructure projects (hereinafter referred to as megaprojects) are facing an unprecedented environmental sensitivity period, strategic opportunity period, and value reconstruction period
In the context of the Belt and Road Initiative and the national strategy for sustainable development, China’s major infrastructure projects are facing an unprecedented environmental sensitivity period, strategic opportunity period, and value reconstruction period
This paper aims at the problem of low engineering efficiency caused by the subcontractor’s double information asymmetry behaviors, which are adverse selection and moral hazard
Summary
In the context of the Belt and Road Initiative and the national strategy for sustainable development, China’s major infrastructure projects (hereinafter referred to as megaprojects) are facing an unprecedented environmental sensitivity period, strategic opportunity period, and value reconstruction period. In addition to paying attention to the progress, cost, and quality of the projects themselves, the stakeholders of megaprojects should focus on project social responsibilities such as avoiding harm to public safety, maintaining ecological balance, and achieving sustainable development [1]. Some project stakeholders excessively pursue their economic interests while neglecting social responsibilities, leading to frequent accidents. Subcontractors cut corners and built-in violation of regulations; government departments had information asymmetry in those mentioned above lacking social responsibility behaviors, leading to government supervision and management dereliction, which eventually led to tragic accidents [2]. Even the consequences of general projects due to the lack of social responsibility are such serious, to say nothing of the megaproject.
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