Design of distributed trading mechanism for prosumers considering the psychological gap effect in community electricity markets

Abstract

With the large-scale customer-side development of distributed energy and continuous advancements in power market reform, the market-oriented trading of distributed power generation with the participation of prosumers has gradually become an important solution to promote the consumption of distributed energy. In addition, prosumers exhibit obvious bounded rationality characteristics; therefore, the design of efficient and reasonable trading mechanisms determines the efficiency of the market. From this perspective, a distributed electricity market trading mechanism based on the Stackelberg game is proposed for the community electricity trading market, with multiple prosumers participating in the distribution side. Firstly, the trading architecture of the community electricity market was established under the distribution network level. Secondly, the pricing strategy of the distribution network operator and the quantitative strategy of community prosumers were analysed; on this basis, the characteristics of the bounded rationality of prosumers were considered, and the impact of the psychological gap effect of prosumers on their energy utility was introduced into the objective function of prosumers. This facilitated the construction of a Stackelberg game model in which distribution network operators lead and community prosumers follow. Thirdly, the Stackelberg equilibrium was proven to exist and be unique, which was then solved by the distributed algorithm – combining the evolutionary algorithm and quadratic programming – which improves the solution efficiency and effectively protects the privacy of prosumers. Finally, the effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed trading mechanism were verified through numerical examples.