Design of AC state estimation based cyber-physical attack for disrupting electricity market operation under limited sensor information

Abstract

The deregulated electricity market operation in smart grid has resulted in a conducive scenario for both the utility and consumer. However, the deep integration of cyber components in the physical infrastructure has increased the vulnerability to attacks by intruders. As compared to an isolated cyber or physical attack, the coordinated attack involving both the physical and cyber layer has a wider impact on the smart grid operation. This paper proposes an AC state estimation (AC-SE) based coordinated cyber-physical attack for disrupting the market operation by manipulating the nodal price. Knowledge of the system configuration and real-time sensor information eases the task of launching an attack. However, the availability of such knowledge is somewhat unrealistic due to accessibility and budget constraints. In this regard, the proposed attack design considers the realistic scenario of incomplete information regarding network topology and sensor data. The first stage of the attack involves identifying the most vulnerable branch that causes maximum deviation in the nodal price allocation between pre-attack and post-attack scenarios. In the second stage, a cyber-attack is synthesized to hide the impact of a physical attack. The effectiveness of the scheme has been validated on benchmark IEEE 14,39, and 118 bus power systems.