Abstract
In this paper, we propose a novel 77 GHz automotive radar sensor, and demonstrate its cyberattack resilience using real measurements. The proposed system is built upon a standard Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave (FMCW) radar RF-front end, and the novelty is in the DSP algorithm used at the firmware level. All attack scenarios are based on real radar signals generated by Texas Instruments AWR series 77 GHz radars, and all measurements are done using the same radar family. For sensor networks, including interconnected autonomous vehicles sharing radar measurements, cyberattacks at the network/communication layer is a known critical problem, and has been addressed by several different researchers. What is addressed in this paper is cyberattacks at the physical layer, that is, adversarial agents generating 77 GHz electromagnetic waves which may cause a false target detection, false distance/velocity estimation, or not detecting an existing target. The main algorithm proposed in this paper is not a predictive filtering based cyberattack detection scheme where an “unusual” difference between measured and predicted values triggers an alarm. The core idea is based on a kind of physical challenge-response authentication, and its integration into the radar DSP firmware.
Highlights
During the last decade, various levels of connectivity and autonomy gained significant importance in automotive industry, and this trend triggered large research projects both in the academia and in the industry [1,2]
In an autonomous vehicles (AV) system, radars are typically used for target detection, and range/velocity estimation, and AV algorithms use this information for steering decisions [3,4]
We have a significantly improved algorithm which is tested using real data obtained by utilizing the techniques developed in References [19,20,21]
Summary
Various levels of connectivity and autonomy gained significant importance in automotive industry, and this trend triggered large research projects both in the academia and in the industry [1,2]. PF , must be low Cyberattack miss rate, PM , must be low Among these three objectives, the first two are obvious, and the last one basically means that if a cyberattack is below the detection threshold, its effect on radar DSP should be small. Our attack resilient radar DSP algorithm is designed to be robust for such cases, and it will be shown that the effect of such cyberattacks which are just below the detection threshold are comparable to the effect system noise, see Section 7. This is probably the most important observation made in this work.
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