Design of a cyber security framework for ADS-B based surveillance systems

Abstract

The need for increased surveillance due to increase in flight volume in remote or oceanic regions outside the range of traditional radar coverage has been fulfilled by the advent of space-based Automatic Dependent Surveillance — Broadcast (ADS-B) Surveillance systems. ADS-B systems have the capability of providing air traffic controllers with highly accurate real-time flight data. ADS-B is dependent on digital communications between aircraft and ground stations of the air route traffic control center (ARTCC); however these communications are not secured. Anyone with the appropriate capabilities and equipment can interrogate the signal and transmit their own false data; this is known as spoofing. The possibility of this type of attacks decreases the situational awareness of United States airspace. The purpose of this project is to design a secure transmission framework that prevents ADS-B signals from being spoofed. Three alternative methods of securing ADS-B signals are evaluated: hashing, symmetric encryption, and asymmetric encryption. Security strength of the design alternatives is determined from research. Feasibility criteria are determined by comparative analysis of alternatives. Economic implications and possible collision risk is determined from simulations that model the United State airspace over the Gulf of Mexico and part of the airspace under attack respectively. The ultimate goal of the project is to show that if ADS-B signals can be secured, the situational awareness can improve and the ARTCC can use information from this surveillance system to decrease the separation between aircraft and ultimately maximize the use of the United States airspace.