Abstract
Mobile multihop relay (MMR) WiMAX networks have attracted lots of interest in the wireless communication industry recently because of its scalable coverage, improved data rates, and relatively low cost. However, security of MMR WiMAX networks is the main challenge to be addressed. In this paper, we first identify several possible attacks on MMR WiMAX networks in which a rogue base station (BS) or relay station (RS) can get authenticated and gain control over the connections and show that the current standard does not address this problem well. We then propose a set of new authentication protocols for protecting MMR WiMAX networks from rogue BS attack, rogue RS attack, and suppress-replay attack. Our protocols can provide centralized authentication by using a trusted authentication server to support mutual authentication between RS and BS, between RS and RS, and between mobile station (MS) and RS. Moreover, our protocols can also provide distributed authentication with a license issued by the trusted server. We use a formal tool called Scyther to analyze and verify the security properties of our protocols. The results show that our protocols can counter rogue BS and RS attacks and suppress-replay attack and are not susceptible to any known attacks.
Highlights
In the era of the Internet of Things (IoT) when every device is connected to the Internet, one of the most important technical enablers is the wireless technologies and infrastructure that make connecting different things possible
In order to address these new issues found in our previous paper, we propose in this paper a complete authentication solution to address the rogue base station (BS) and rogue relay station (RS) attacks in Mobile multihop relay (MMR) WiMAX networks, the suppress-replay attack found in our previous scheme, and a distributed authentication scheme between RSs
In order to solve the problems like security zone key update, DDoS attack, and rogue RS attack, in [20], the authors propose a design of hybrid authentication and key distribution scheme to support the IEEE 802.16j MMR requirements
Summary
In the era of the Internet of Things (IoT) when every device is connected to the Internet, one of the most important technical enablers is the wireless technologies and infrastructure that make connecting different things (devices) possible. (vi) Protection of nonauthenticated Pairwise Master Key (PKM) messages by MR-BS and the access RS, that is, any nonauthenticated PKM messages which are transmitted between MS and MR-BS through the access RS will be protected by the HMAC/CMAC based on the shared security associations established between MR-BS and the access RS Even with these additional functionalities, researchers in [6] found that the security mechanism in IEEE 802.16j (part of current IEEE 802.16-2012 standard) is still not adequate in that it has vulnerabilities in its weak protection of some PKM messages and security zone key update and is susceptible to DoS attacks on BS and rogue BS and rogue RS attacks. In our previous conference paper [7], we focused on addressing the rogue BS and rogue RS attacks in MMR WiMAX networks with centralized authentication schemes and designed a set of protocols to address the aforementioned attacks.
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